An Inquiry into Corruption Norms: Survey Data of GRIPS Alumni by SONOBE Tetsushi
 
 
 
 
GRIPS Discussion Paper 12-15 
 
 
 
 
 
An Inquiry into Corruption Norms: Survey Data          
of GRIPS Alumni            
  
 
 
 
 
By 
 
 
Tetsushi Sonobe 
 
 
 
 
 
 
November 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies 
7-22-1 Roppongi, Minato-ku, 
Tokyo, Japan 106-8677 
 
 An Inquiry into Corruption Norms: 
Survey Data of GRIPS Alumni 
 
Tetsushi Sonobe 
(National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies) 
 
September 2012 
A manuscript for a chapter to be included in State Building and Economic Development 
edited by Keijiro Otsuka and Takashi Shiraishi 
 
Abstract 
Corruption norms are standards shared by members of a society regarding moral 
attitudes of approval and disapproval toward corruption.  Finding out how to deal with 
corruption norms is a challenge for state building and economic development.  This 
study attempts to deepen our understanding of two aspects of corruption norms.  The 
first is about how precisely the norms specify the distinction between acceptable and 
unacceptable behaviors.  The second is about the empirical validity of the view that 
corruption norms keep changing and can be changed.  This study attempts to offer new 
insights into these issues by using survey data of alumni of the National Graduate 
Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Japan, who are mostly government officials in 58 
countries.   
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1. Introduction 
Corruption hampers state building and economic development.  Corrupt officials 
and politicians embezzle funds intended for the provision of basic public services and 
the construction of infrastructure (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Reinikka and 
Svenson, 2005; Olken, 2007).  Corruption makes the political legitimacy of the state 
more dubious and undermines democracy (e.g., Rose-Ackerman, 1999).  Bribes 
discourage firms’ investments, including foreign direct investments, like taxes (e.g., 
Mauro, 1995; Wei, 2000), but bribes damage firm growth more severely than taxes 
(Fisman and Svensson, 2007), probably because the secrecy and uncertainty 
accompanied by bribery increase transaction costs higher (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993).  
Cross-country studies find that corruption hinders the economic growth of developing 
countries significantly (e.g., Mauro, 1995).   
An approach to combating corruption is to impose more severe penalties and 
increase the probability of detection and punishment.  Becker and Stigler (1974) argue 
that the level of deterrence expenditure is optimal when the marginal cost of deterrence 
equals the marginal benefit.  Compelling evidence for this view was unavailable 
because of the difficulty in measuring corruption directly.  Recently, however, 
excellent studies by Olken (2007), Fisman and Miguel (2007), Reinikka and Svensson 
(2011), and Ferraz and Finan (2011) among others have used natural experiments and 
randomized controlled trials to show that strict audits, media campaigns, and other 
carrot-and-stick approaches serve as effective deterrents to corruption.  For example, 
one media campaign that provided schools and parents with information to monitor 
local officials’ handling of school subsidies reduced the local capture of the subsidies 
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drastically (Reinikka and Svensson, 2011). 
These empirical results are encouraging but do not assure success in corruption 
eradication.  As Rose-Ackerman (1999), Fisman and Miguel (2007), and many others 
argue cogently, citizens, government officials, and politicians in corrupt societies tend 
to be more accepting of corrupt behaviors than those in clean societies.  Such a social 
norm dampens the enthusiasm for efforts to reduce corruption, stifles the effect of the 
efforts in the long run, and perpetuates corruption.  Finding out how to deal with 
corruption norms is a challenge for state building and economic development. 
This study attempts to address two issues about corruption norms.1  There is no 
consensus about the definition of corruption norms.  This study refers to them as social 
attitudes of approval or disapproval toward corrupt behaviors.  Recently, an important 
contribution to the literature was made by Truex (2011).  His point is that because 
corruption comprises various types, corruption norms should be gauged not only by the 
general extent of corruption acceptance but also by the pattern of attitudes toward 
different types of corruption.  Indeed, he shows that citizens in Kathmandu, Nepal, 
have varying attitudes toward different types of corrupt behaviors.  Since Nepal is a 
corrupt country according to corruption rankings such as Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI), he argues that such a variation is a feature of 
corruption norms in corrupt societies.  This part of his argument, however, could be 
more persuasive if the Nepalese society were compared with a less corrupt society.  
The first issue of the present study is to provide such a comparison group.   
                                               
1
  This study focuses on demographically widespread corruption undertaken by a large proportion 
of government officials.  The other kind of corruption includes monopolistic corruption in 
monarchies, oligarchies, and autocracies. See Shleifer and Vishny (1993) for details. 
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For this purpose, a survey of the alumni members of the National Graduate 
Institute of Policy Studies (GRIPS) was administered through the internet by using a 
questionnaire that contains the same questions used by Truex (2011).  GRIPS is the 
leading graduate school of policy studies in Japan.  The vast majority of its student 
body consists of mid-career government officials, and two-thirds of them are from the 
outside of Japan.  315 graduates from 58 countries responded to this survey, thereby 
providing a comparison group consisting of highly educated officials in a number of 
countries with varying CPI rankings and income levels.  Our data indicate that in 
high-income countries, corruption is almost always unacceptable for most respondents 
regardless of the type of corrupt behaviors, while in low-income countries, such 
behaviors may or may not be acceptable depending on the person and the details of 
situation or the context.  We also find that government officials in low-income 
countries and ordinary citizens in Nepal in particular have significantly different 
attitudes to some types of corruption, and that their differences lack a clear pattern.  
Such corruption norms in low-income countries would be a source of uncertainty and 
unpredictability and, hence, high transaction costs.   
From these observations, a question arises as to whether developing countries can 
detach themselves from traditional corruption norms and adopt a new social norm that 
encourages individuals to maintain strict attitudes toward corruption.  Rose-Ackerman 
(1999, p. 110) argues that corruption norms are “dynamic and constantly changing.”  
Sah (2007) has developed a theoretical model explaining the dynamics of corruption 
norms.  In this model, public and private actors individually choose whether or not to 
be corrupt, based on their current perceptions of gains, costs (legal, economic, and 
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social sanctions), and detection probability, which are formed and revised over time 
based on their personal experiences, acquaintances’ experiences, education, media, and 
all other information, and their choices in turn influence their own and others’ future 
perceptions.  Thus, individuals’ attitudes toward corruption change with the times, 
together with their perceptions of the functioning of institutions that affect the gains, 
costs, and detection probability of corruption. 
Although testing or estimating Sah’s dynamic, general equilibrium model is too 
much to hope for, our second issue is to examine whether our data of GRIPS alumni are 
consistent or inconsistent with some of the predictions of the Sah model.  Our 
descriptive analysis finds that the corruption norms of a country are correlated with the 
perceived quality of the audit system and the media of the country and with the 
perceived attitude of the compatriots toward corruption, which is consistent with the 
model’s prediction.  We also use a regression approach, looking at the association 
between government officials’ self-rated discipline and socio-economic characteristics, 
and find that older cohorts and those living in rural areas tend to be more accepting of 
corruption, which is also consistent with the model.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows.  Section 2 explains Truex’s 
(2011) well thought out questions eliciting survey respondents’ opinions of different 
types of corrupt behaviors.  The GRIPS alumni survey included exactly the same set of 
questions.  Section 3 is devoted to descriptive analyses with a view to reinforcing the 
results of Truex’s study.  We then attempt to test the predictions of the Sah model of 
the dynamics of corruption norms by using descriptive analysis in Section 4 and by 
regression analysis in Section 5.  Section 6 contains the concluding remarks.   
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2. The Design of the Survey 
Corruption is multidimensional.  One may accept a type of corruption but not 
another type.  Moreover, opinions may be divided as to which types are acceptable 
even if people share the same overall level of corruption acceptance.  To substantiate 
this point, Truex (2011) conducted a survey in Kathmandu by using the 13 well thought 
out questions that are shown in Table 1.  Each question describes a problematic 
behavior, which the respondents rate on a scale of one to five, where five means that the 
behavior is very unacceptable and one means that the behavior is very acceptable.  The 
questions are well designed so that a pair of slightly different questions isolates 
differences in attitudes along a given dimension.  For example, Q4 and Q5 are 
intended to capture different attitudes toward a politician’s nepotism and a 
businessman’s nepotism.  Similarly, Q1 and Q2 differ in the scale of corruption, while 
Q2 and Q3 are about the distinction between a gift bribe and a cash bribe.  Note that no 
public actor appears in Q5 and Q8 while the other questions involve one.  With a 
sample of 853 pedestrians in Kathmandu who were willing to participate in the survey, 
Truex (2011) finds interesting patterns of respondents’ attitudes toward different types 
of corruption, as will be described in the next section.   
The present study asks GRIPS alumni members the same set of questions to see 
how government officials differ from ordinary citizens and how high-income countries 
differ from low-income countries in the level and pattern of corruption acceptance.  In 
the GRIPS Alumni Survey, hundreds of graduates from GRIPS received an e-mail 
message requesting that they fill out and return the questionnaire through the internet.  
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This chapter is written based on the 315 questionnaires returned within one month from 
the end of June 2012.  The survey questionnaire includes the 13 original questions and 
questions eliciting the respondent’s opinions of the level of corruption, the functioning 
of the audit system, the credibility of media, and the citizens’ attitudes toward 
corruption in his or her country.  The questionnaire also includes questions about the 
respondent’s socio-economic characteristics and preferences, such as risk attitudes, 
patience, and procrastination.  Although some respondents left some questions 
unanswered, the data of 300 respondents from 58 countries are usable.  
Table 2 lists the 58 countries, their GNI per capita and Transparency 
International’s CPI score, the number of respondents by country, and the country-level 
averages of the following five variables.  PUBSCORE is an average score for the 
eleven behaviors involving public actors.  The country-level average of this variable 
is our measure of corruption norms.  LEVEL indicates the respondent’s subjective 
evaluation of the level of corruption in his or her country, where 1 means that the 
country is highly corrupt and 5 means that it is very clean.  AUDIT and MEDIA are 
the subjective evaluations of the performance of the audit system and the credibility of 
the domestic media of the country, respectively.  Similarly, ATTITUDE is the 
anticorruption attitude of the citizens of the country subjectively rated by the respondent, 
where 1 means that the citizens have very strict attitudes toward public corruption and 5 
means that they are accepting of public corruption.  Columns (4) to (8) of Table 2 
report the country-level averages of these variables except for those countries which 
have only one respondent.  These data are kept secret in order to protect personal 
information because it may be easy to identify the respondents from such countries.   
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Our survey data are subject to four biases.  The first is the bias in occupation.  
Most GRIPS students are government officials.  The second is the bias toward high 
education.  All respondents are master’s degree holders.  These biases are needed to 
provide a comparison group for Truex’s sample of ordinary citizens and are also useful 
for the purpose of our analysis because those who have similar socio-economic 
characteristics may have quite different perceptions according to the Sah model.  To be 
more precise, however, our respondents’ occupations are not completely homogeneous 
because some respondents have left their government posts for the private sector.  
About 75 percent of the respondents are government officials, and the vast majority of 
them work at their central governments.  About 10 percent work at national 
universities, and about 15 percent at private or quasi-governmental organizations.  As 
to education, one third of the respondents have another master’s degree, and 10 percent 
have a doctoral degree.   
The third bias is the so called social desirability bias (SDB), which refers to the 
bias arising from a tendency of respondents to give more socially acceptable or 
respectable answers than their true answers (Arnold and Feldman, 1981).  SDB would 
understate corruption norms.  Although our questionnaire requested respondents to 
answer the questions as honestly as they could, this might not be enough to prevent 
SDB.  We hope that SDB is less serious in internet surveys than in surveys in which 
respondents have face-to-face contact with the enumerator.  In this regard, however, 
we should note that some countries have only a small number of graduates from GRIPS.  
If the respondents from such countries thought that they could be identified easily, their 
answers may be affected by SDB.  Thus, if there is any systematic difference between 
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the data from these countries and those from the other countries, the former should be 
excluded from the analysis or their influences should be controlled for.   
As Truex (2011) argues, SDB is essentially an omitted variable bias.  Thus, in 
our regression analysis below, we use a number of variable as controls, including the 
variables representing the respondent’s preference for risk aversion, patience, and 
preference for relative evaluation (as opposed to absolute evaluation) of one’s 
performance, and proclivity for procrastination (i.e. delaying doing something that 
should be done).  Since procrastination carries a disapproving tone, those who admit to 
this proclivity candidly may be more immune from SDB.  Thus, we hope that this 
variable effectively mitigates the confounding due to SDB.  
Finally, our survey data must suffer from selection bias: those who were 
unwilling to respond did not respond to the survey.  In this study, we have no 
countermeasure to this perennial concern other than taking great care when we interpret 
the results of the analysis.   
 
3. Comparative Approach to Corruption Norms 
Table 3 shows the scores for the 13 problematic behaviors and PUBSCORE for 
the residents in Kathmandu in column (1) and the GRIPS alumni in columns (2) to (4).  
In this table, the 58 countries are classified into three categories according to GNI per 
capita, and these categories are referred to as low-, middle-, and high-income countries.  
The naming of the three categories is just for convenience and does not follow the 
definition given by the World Bank or other organizations.  The low-income category 
has 138 respondents from 24 countries, the middle-income category has 138 
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respondents from 22 countries, and the high-income category has 33 respondents from 
12 countries.  Since Nepal is one of the low-income countries in our classification, 
Truex’s sample occupies a column next to that for the low-income countries to facilitate 
comparison.  As one would expect, GNI per capital and CPI score are highly correlated.  
Their correlation coefficient in the sample of the 58 countries is as high as 0.90.  Thus, 
the above classification of countries is nearly equivalent to the classification into corrupt, 
less corrupt, and relatively clean countries.   
     The citizens’ in Nepal and the GRIPS graduates in low-income countries share 
almost the same PUBSCOREs, the average scores for the 11 questions about behaviors 
that involve a public actor.  Thus, ordinary citizens and highly educated government 
officials in low-income countries do not differ in the overall level of corruption 
acceptance.  However, their attitudes toward some behaviors are very different.  First, 
GRIPS graduates from low-income countries are more accepting of a bureaucrat’s 
nepotism (Q6, bureaucrat job) than a businessman’s grand cash giving (Q1, grand cash), 
while these behaviors are equally unacceptable for the citizens in Nepal.  Second, they 
are more disapproving to petty bribery-giving associated with tax evasion by private 
actors, such as Q2 (petty cash), Q3 (petty gift), and Q10 (deserved giver).  Third, they 
are more accepting of petty favoritism given by a government employee to a friend 
(Q13, favoritism ticket).  Fourth, however, they are harsh to favoritism if a government 
employee gives a contract to a friend (Q9, favoritism contract).   
As to Q5 (private job) and Q8 (private contract), which are not included in 
PUBSCORE because they do not involve a public actor, the Kathmandu sample and our 
sample from low-income countries show a stark contrast.  The GRIPS alumni, 
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regardless of income levels of their countries, have very low scores for the nepotism of 
a private actor (Q5), compared with the Nepalese counterpart as well as scores for the 
other questions, on the one hand.  On the other hand, the GRIPS alumni do not think 
that bribery between private actors (Q8) is more acceptable than bribery between public 
and private actors (Q7) when the stake is a contract. 
     Is there any clear pattern in these differences between the Kathmandu sample and 
our sample?  Our sample may have a tendency of self-indulgence in the sense that 
GRIPS alumni appear to be more disapproving of private actors’ cheating than public 
actors’ corrupt behaviors.  Is there any other pattern in differences?  From the 
comparison between Q9 (favoritism contract) and Q13 (favoritism ticket) or between 
Q5 (private job) and Q8 (private contract), one may think that the GRIPS alumni pay 
attention to “contract” or the amount of money involved in the corruption.  Note, 
however, that the GRIPS alumni from low-income countries gave a slightly lower score 
for Q7 (a company offers a bribe to receive a contract) than for Q3 (a shopkeeper offers 
a small amount of money to avoid taxes) and Q4 (a shopkeeper offers a small gift to 
avoid taxes).  There does not seem to be a principle or a clear pattern. 
     We now look at columns (3) and (4) as well.  The scores in these columns are 
mostly near five in the high-income countries.  The vast majority of the respondents in 
the high-income countries rated five for most questions.  The differences in the scores 
between the middle- and high-income countries are significant at the 1 percent level for 
Q1, Q4, and Q7, and at the 5 percent level for Q9, and Q13 as well as the aggregate 
indicator, PUBSCORE.  The differences in the scores between the middle- and 
low-income countries are significant at the 1 percent level for most questions.  The 
11 
 
exceptions are Q5 (private job), Q8 (private contract), and Q10 (deserved giver) only.  
While the middle- and high-income countries differ in the overall level of corruption 
acceptance (i.e., PUBSCORE), they share the same patterns of scores for different 
questions.  Compared with them, the low-income countries are different in attitudes to 
Q4 (political job) and Q13 (favoritism ticket).  But this difference in pattern of 
attitudes between government officials in the low- and middle-income countries is small, 
compared with the difference in pattern of attitudes between ordinary citizens and 
government officials in low-income countries.  
     Truex’s (2011) contribution to the literature on corruption is that he shows that 
attitudes toward different types of corruption are different.  Our addition to his finding 
is that ordinary citizens and government officials in low-income countries have different 
attitudes toward different types of corruption and that the difference between them does 
not have a clear pattern.  Although Truex (2011) does not emphasize this, he also finds 
that the corruption acceptance, as measured in terms of the scores, varies from person to 
person and that the extent of variation as measured in terms of standard errors vary with 
the types of corruption.  Moreover, an inspection of columns (2), (3), and (4) 
establishes that standard errors are greater in the low-income countries than in the 
middle- and high-income countries. 
     In relation to the variation just mentioned, we should pay attention to what the 
respondents think when they give a rating of four instead of five to a question.  
Probably, they would be sure that the corrupt behavior described in a question was 
unacceptable when they rated the behavior a five.  When they rate it a four (or less 
than five), some of them would mean that they were less acceptable.  But some other 
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respondents would think that they were less sure, or that whether the behavior was 
acceptable or unacceptable would depend on the details of the situation.  The extent 
that this way of thinking prevailed, the meaning of the standard error of the score is 
different.  Suppose that everyone gives a four to a behavior (i.e., zero standard error).  
This means that some approve of it but others disapprove of it, depending on their mood 
and the details of the corruption.  In short, the variability can be larger than the 
standard errors suggest. 
Thus, although the term “cultural norm” may give an impression that it specifies 
what is acceptable or unacceptable, cultural norms in corrupt societies are less specific 
and more elusive.  A major message of Table 3 is that ordinary citizens and 
government officials in corrupt society distinguish acceptable and unacceptable 
behaviors in different manners, and that their differences are elusive.  Another major 
message is that even among government officials in countries with similar income 
levels, the distinction between acceptable and unacceptable behaviors varies from one 
person to another and from one situation to another.   
These findings offer a new piece of evidence to Shleifer and Vishny’s (1993) 
assertion that corruption increases transaction costs more than taxes.  “Corruption is 
often thought of as like a tax or a fee.  Bribes, like taxes, create a wedge between the 
actual and privately appropriated marginal product of capital” (Svensson, 2005, p. 20).  
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) point out that corruption is necessarily accompanied by 
secrecy and uncertainty and argue that secrecy and uncertainty create additional 
transaction costs.  While secrecy is obvious, evidence for uncertainty has been scarce.  
Table 3 can be regarded as a piece of such evidence.  The approach pioneered by 
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Truex (2011) will help us supply abundant evidence in future.  
 
4. Correlates of Corruption Norms  
In the dynamic model developed by Sah (2007), individuals’ attitudes toward 
corruption change with the times, together with their perceptions of the functioning of 
institutions that affect the gains, costs, and detection probability of corruption.  
Suppose that today’s developed countries have actually had such an evolution of 
perceptions while developing countries have not.  It is expected that government 
officials will be more disciplined in countries where anti-corruption institutions, such as 
audit systems and the media, are perceived to work well and citizens are perceived to be 
strongly disapproving of corruption.  Or, to put it another way, our respondents’ 
attitude toward corruption (PUBSCORE) is correlated with the perceived performance 
of the audit system (AUDIT), the perceived credibility of the domestic media (MEDIA), 
and the perceived attitude of the ordinary citizens toward corruption (ATTITUDE) at 
the country level.    
As a preliminary analysis, we plotted PUBSCORE and AUDIT both at the 
country level and at the individual level and found that there are outliers whose 
PUBSCORE is high but AUDIT is low.  These outliers are suspected to be subject to 
the socially desirability bias (SDB).  As mentioned in Section 2, the respondents in 
such countries that had only a small number of GRIPS alumni might think that they 
could be more easily identified than correspondents in countries with a larger number of 
GRIPS alumni, such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and Pakistan.  Assuming that the 
number of respondents is roughly proportional to the number of alumni, we suspected 
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that the respondents from the countries with a small number of respondents would be 
more likely to be subject to SDB and to have unduly high values of PUBSCORE.   
It turned out that there were 22 cases of countries with only one respondent, and 
that their mean PUBSCORE was 4.80, while that for the other respondents was as low 
as 4.48.  The difference was significant at the 1 percent level.  Moreover, there were 
61 cases of countries with four respondents or less, and their mean PUBSCORE was 
4.67, which is higher than the other respondents’ mean of 4.47 at the 1 percent level of 
significance.  These significant differences deepen the suspicion of SDB inflating the 
PUBSCORE of some of the respondents from these countries.   
     Based on these observations and considerations, Table 4 juxtaposes three matrices 
showing the coefficients of correlation among the six variables (PUBSCORE, LEVEL, 
AUDIT, MEDIA, ATTITUDE, and CPI score) in the full sample of countries, the 
sub-sample of countries with three or more respondents, and that of countries with five 
or more respondents, respectively.  In Panel A, where all the sample countries are 
included,2 the correlation between PUBSCORE and the other variables are generally 
low and that between PUBSCORE and AUDIT is particularly low.  To mitigate SDB, 
the countries with fewer than three respondents are excluded from the sample.  Such 
exclusion will also help to reduce the impacts of outliers.  The result is shown in Panel 
B, where the correlation coefficient for PUBSCORE and AUDIT is much higher than in 
Panel A, but the coefficients for PUBSCORE and the other variables are not different 
from Panel A.  To mitigate SDB further, Panel C focuses on the countries with five or 
                                               
2 In the calculation of the correlation coefficients shown in Table 4, Fiji is not included because 
Fiji does not have a CPI score.  Thus, the number of observations is 57, not 58. 
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more respondents.  Here, PUBSCORE is correlated more closely with each of the 
other variables, and the correlation among the other variables is generally high.  Given 
the nature of subjective ratings, correlation coefficients of 0.4 to 0.7 can be regarded as 
indicating close correlation.  These results are consistent with the Sah (2007) model. 
 
5. Factors Associated with Attitude toward Corruption 
     In this section, we try to test the following hypotheses derived from the Sah 
(2007) model: (i) government officials in a less corrupt country tend to take a stronger 
position against corruption, (ii) older cohorts of officials tend to be more accepting of 
corruption than younger cohorts within the same country, (iii) those officials living or 
working in rural areas tend to be more accepting of corruption than those in urban areas, 
and (iv) government officials with similar socio-economic characteristics may have 
quite different attitudes toward corruption.  Here, the unit of analysis and hence the 
unit of observation is an individual, not a country. 
For this purpose, we estimate a regression equation as follows: 
 
       PUBSCOREi = Xiβ + Ziγ + εi ,                       (1) 
 
where the dependent variable, PUBSCOREi is an indicator of discipline for respondent i, 
Xi is a vector of socio-economic characteristics, Zi is a vector of preference variables, 
and εi is an error term.  Vector Xi includes the country of residence, age, sex, religion, 
place of birth, place of residence, occupation, and the logarithm of annual income in US 
dollars.  Education could be included in Xi, because some of our respondents have a 
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Ph.D. or two master’s degrees but not just one master’s degree, and because Truex 
(2011) finds a strong effect of education on PUBSCORE in the sample of ordinary 
citizens in Kathmandu.  In our sample, however, education variables do not have any 
significant coefficients and the inclusion of them alters completely nothing in the 
qualitative results of the analysis.  The country of residence is represented by a set of 
country dummy variables, each corresponding to a particular country.  An alternative 
specification is to replace the set of country dummies by the CPI score of the country of 
residence.  This specification allows us to see whether PUBSCORE is higher (that is, 
government officials are more disciplined) in less corrupt countries than more corrupt 
countries.  The inclusion of Zi in equation (1) is intended to mitigate SDB and omitted 
variable biases.  This vector consists of the measures of attitudes toward risk-taking, 
patience, preference for relative evaluation over absolute evaluation, and the proclivity 
for procrastination, each of which is the individual’s subjective rating on a scale of 1 to 
5. 
     The estimated coefficients of interest are reported in Table 5, which has 12 
columns.  The specification with the CPI score is used in the first three columns and 
columns (7) to (9).  While the first three columns use all the observations with the 
complete set of data necessary for this specification, columns (7) to (9) use a 
sub-sample from those countries with at least five respondents in order to mitigate SDB.  
The sample used is the whole sample in columns (1) and (7) but limited to the 
developing countries (that is, the low- and middle-income countries) in columns (2) and 
(8) and to the low-income countries in columns (3) and (9).  In the other columns, the 
specification with the country dummies is used.  Columns (4) to (6) use the sub-sample 
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from the countries with at least two respondents, while columns (10) to (12) use the 
sub-sample from the countries with at least five respondents. 
     The coefficients on the CPI score are positive in all cases and significant at the 
one percent level for the full sample and the sub-sample of developing countries.  Thus, 
government officials in more corrupt countries tend to be less disciplined.  The relative 
magnitude of the coefficients as well as the significance levels indicates that this 
tendency is particularly strong among middle-income countries.  These results, 
together with the differences in PUBSCORE among the three country categories shown 
in Table 3, are consistent with Hypothesis (i). 
     The age of the individual has a negative coefficient, which is generally 
insignificant when the CPI score is included in the regression but highly significant 
when the country dummies are used.  The latter specification accounts for country 
fixed effects, that is, the effects of both observable and unobserved factors common to 
the country of residence, including the CPI score, on PUBSCORE.  Thus, for the 
purpose of estimating the association between the individual’s characteristics and 
PUBSCORE, the latter specification must be superior.  Both the estimated coefficients 
on age and their significance levels are slightly higher when SDB is mitigated, that is, in 
columns (10) to (12).  These results are consistent with Hypothesis (ii).  Note, 
however, that Hypothesis (ii) can be obtained from two different dynamic processes.  
The Sah model predicts that when a society becomes less corrupt, every person tends to 
become increasingly disciplined with age, and a younger cohort starts from a higher 
level than an older cohort.  Alternatively, Hypothesis (ii) applies to the case in which 
every cohort starts from the same level and becomes less and less disciplined with age.  
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Thus, while our results are consistent with the hypothesis, they do not lend strong 
support to the Sah model. 
     There is no gender gap in PUBSCORE if the effects of other characteristics and 
traits are controlled for.  The coefficient on the female dummy is positive and 
marginally significant in column (8), indicating that female officials are more 
disciplined, but the coefficient is no longer significant if the country fixed effects are 
taken into account.  Religion is not associated with PUBSCORE, either.  As 
mentioned earlier, a small number of respondents are employees of private or 
quasi-government organizations.  The variable named Private sector is equal to one if 
the respondent falls in this category, and it is zero otherwise.  The coefficient on this 
variable is insignificant in all columns.  
     The information on the place of birth and the place of current residence is 
presented with two variables.  One is Urban to Urban, a dummy variable which is 
equal to one if the respondent was born in an urban area and is living in an urban area, 
and zero otherwise.  The other is Rural to Urban, a dummy variable which is one if the 
respondent was born in a rural or suburban area but is living in an urban area, and zero 
otherwise.  About 20 percent of the sample is currently living in a rural area.  About 
half of the rest are from rural or suburban areas (i.e., Rural to Urban = 1), and the other 
half are from urban areas (i.e., Urban to Urban = 1).  The coefficients on these two 
dummy variables are generally positive and significant if the full sample or the 
developing country sample is used, especially when the country fixed effects are taken 
into account (see columns (4), (5), (10), and (11)).  These results are consistent with 
Hypothesis (iii).   
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Both the magnitude and significance of the coefficient on the Rural to Urban 
dummy are greater than those of the Urban to Urban dummy, and the difference in the 
coefficient is significant in some columns.  Thus, the rural to urban migrants are less 
accepting of corruption than those raised in urban areas, while the rural dwellers are the 
most accepting of corruption.  In the low-income countries the coefficients on these 
dummy variables are small in magnitude and statistically insignificant, which suggests 
that urban and rural areas share similar corruption cultures in the low-income countries.  
It is difficult to explain why these results are obtained.   
     The coefficient on annual income is positive and significant in every column.  
Note that the majority of the respondents are government officials, and that the variation 
in the average income level of the country is absorbed by the country fixed effects or to 
a lesser extent by the CPI score.  The positive coefficient on annual income is likely to 
indicate that government officials in higher positions tend to be less accepting of 
corruption.  At least a few explanations for this result come to mind immediately.  
First, those officials who are less frank or alter answers to sound more socially desirable 
are more likely to get promoted.  That is, candidness is a third factor affecting both 
annual income and PUBSCORE.  Second, those officials who are more disciplined are 
more likely to get promoted.  That is, there is a reverse causation.  Third, higher 
positions make officials more disciplined.  It is possible that all these causations 
coexist behind the positive coefficient on annual income.   
     The coefficients on the preference variables are generally insignificant.  
Exceptions are the positive and significant estimates of the coefficient on 
procrastination in columns (2), (5), (7), (8), and (11).  A possible interpretation of the 
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positive coefficient is that persons prone to procrastination have trouble disciplining 
themselves.  Another possible interpretation is that officials who candidly admit that 
they are prone to procrastination are also candid when they answer the questions about 
the problematic behaviors and, hence, they have lower PUBSCOREs.  That is, SDB is 
captured by the negative coefficient on the procrastination variable. 
The whole result of the regression analysis shown in Table 5 indicates that only a 
very small part of the variation in PUBSCORE can be explained by the country fixed 
effects, socio-economic characteristics, and preference or mentality variables.  A 
possible explanation is that the variance of PUBSCORE is inflated by measurement 
errors.  However, it is difficult to imagine that the respondents committed errors 
frequently when they gave their opinions of the problematic behaviors.  To the extent 
that measurement errors are not serious, one can say that persons with similar 
characteristics can have quite different attitudes toward corruption, and that the low 
explanatory power of equation (1) is consistent with Hypothesis (iv). 
      
6. Concluding Remarks 
     This study has attempted to deepen our understanding of corruption norms by 
extending the pioneering work of Truex (2011).  Our sample of GRIPS alumni, 
together with Truex’s sample, has allowed us to find that ordinary citizens and 
government officials in low-income countries make different distinctions between 
acceptable and unacceptable behaviors.  We have also found that corrupt behaviors are 
almost always unacceptable for the majority of GRIPS alumni in high-income countries 
but less likely to be unacceptable for the majority of their counterparts in low-income 
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countries.  Moreover, both the descriptive and regression analyses show that even 
among government officials with similar socio-economic backgrounds, the distinction 
of acceptable and unacceptable behaviors varies substantially from one person to 
another.   
These findings recast our image of corruption norms.  Like other social norms, 
corruption norms are standards of behaviors that are accepted within a society, but they 
are neither very specific nor precisely known to everyone in the society.  Corruption 
norms leave room for the free discretion of individuals and for various interpretations, 
especially in low-income countries.  Thus, corruption norms in such countries would 
be a source of uncertainty and unpredictability, and, hence, higher transaction costs. 
This study has also presented the new piece of evidence that corruption norms are 
not fixed standards but keep changing.  We have found that our data are consistent 
with some predictions derived from Sah’s (2007) model of the dynamics of corruption 
norms and perceptions related to corruption, such as perceived levels of corruption 
prevalence, quality of anti-corruption institutions, such as the audit system and media, 
and compatriots’ attitudes toward corruption.   The model suggests that sustained 
efforts to reduce corruption will be able to have lasting effects and to break traditional 
corruption norms. 
     A way to increase the speed of changing corruption norms and reduce transaction 
costs arising from corruption would be to improve the citizens’ access to information 
about corruption.  Improved access to information may be classified into three types.  
First, as mentioned earlier, Reinikka and Svensson (2011) report an exemplary case in 
which the disclosure of information improves the ability of citizens to monitor local 
22 
 
government officials, leading to a remarkable reduction in corruption.  Second, the 
results of our study about Sah’s model suggest that the increased publicity about the 
probability of detection and punishment and the legal sanctions levied would also be 
helpful.  The information that the probability is increasing or penalties are becoming 
more severe will increase the pace of change in corruption norms in a good direction.  
Of course, when the probability is decreasing and penalties are becoming less severe, 
the increased publicity will induce changes in corruption norms negatively.  
Nonetheless, if such a backward step is not known by citizens, no pressure will be put 
on the government to make greater efforts to reduce corruption. 
     The third type of improved access to corruption information involves gathering 
and disseminating information about the attitudes of other citizens, government officials, 
and politicians toward various types of corruption.  According to the results of our 
study, this will reduce uncertainty and hence transaction costs.  The evaluation of the 
pros and cons of such a policy is an issue for future study.  Another avenue for 
research is to extend the present study so that the sample includes a greater number of 
graduates from not only GRIPS but other public policy schools in other countries.  
Such extended studies will offer more insights into corruption norms and 
anti-corruption measures. 
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Table 1.  13 problematic behaviors from Truex’s (2011) survey 
Question: How do you rate each behavior on a scale from 1 to 5? Question name 
Q1. A businessman offers a senior official a large amount of money 
in order to import goods without paying taxes 
Grand cash 
Q2. A shopkeeper offers a tax collector a small amount of money in 
order to avoid paying taxes 
Petty cash 
Q3. A shopkeeper offers a tax collector a small gift in order to avoid 
paying taxes 
Petty gift 
Q4. A politician gives a job to a family member even though other 
applicants are more qualified 
Politician job 
Q5. A businessman gives a job to a family member even though 
other applicants are more qualified 
Private job 
Q6. A government employee gives a job to a family member even 
though other applicants are more qualified 
Bureaucrat job 
Q7. A construction contractor gives a government employee a large 
gift in hopes of receiving a government construction contract 
Public contract 
Q8. A construction contractor gives a businessman a large gift in 
hopes of receiving a private construction contract 
Private contract 
Q9. A government employee awards a government construction 
contract to a friend’s business because he is a friend 
Favoritism 
contact 
Q10. Because of a delay, a schoolteacher gives a government 
employee a small gift in order to make sure that his passport gets 
processed 
Deserved giver 
Q11. A schoolteacher gives a government employee a small gift in 
order to obtain a passport without proper documentation 
Illicit giver 
Q12. A government employee asks a schoolteacher for a small gift 
in exchange for giving him a passport without proper documentation 
Illicit receiver 
Q13. A police officer does not give a taxi-driver a traffic ticket 
because he is a friend 
Favoritism 
ticket 
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Table 2.  Summary statistics by country 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Country 
name 
GNI per 
capita in 2010 
CPI score Number of 
respondents 
PUBSCORE LEVEL AUDIT MEDIA ATTITUDE 
Afghanistan 910 1.5 2 4.45 1.50 2.00 4.00 3.50 
Australia 36,910 8.8 6 4.97 4.33 4.17 3.83 4.50 
Bangladesh 1,810 2.7 15 4.36 2.33 2.67 3.53 3.20 
Bhutan 4,970 5.7 5 4.73 2.80 3.40 3.00 2.80 
Brunei NA 5.2 1 - - - - - 
Bulgaria 13,510 3.3 2 4.23 2.50 4.00 3.50 4.00 
Cambodia 2,070 2.1 11 3.68 2.27 2.82 3.55 2.64 
China 7,600 3.6 9 4.16 2.00 2.89 2.78 3.33 
Colombia 9,020 3.4 2 4.59 2.50 4.00 3.50 3.50 
Cuba NA 4.2 1 - - - - - 
Egypt 6,030 2.9 1 - - - - - 
El Salvador 6,460 3.4 2 4.95 2.50 1.50 2.00 2.50 
Ethiopia 1,030 2.7 8 3.93 2.00 2.75 2.00 2.25 
Fiji 4,460 NA 1 - - - - - 
Georgia 4,950 4.1 1 - - - - - 
Germany 38,100 8.0 1 - - - - - 
Ghana 1,610 3.9 6 4.86 2.50 3.50 4.00 3.00 
Hungary 19,550 4.6 3 4.79 3.33 2.33 3.33 2.67 
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India 3,340 3.1 8 4.91 2.38 3.75 3.88 2.75 
Indonesia 4,190 3.0 43 4.65 2.49 3.09 3.23 2.86 
Iran NA 2.7 1 - - - - - 
Japan 34,780 8.0 10 4.68 3.60 3.60 3.40 4.00 
Jordan 5,810 4.5 1 - - - - - 
Kazakhstan 10,620 2.7 6 4.50 2.50 3.80 2.33 3.50 
Kenya 1,640 2.2 10 4.46 3.00 3.30 3.70 3.40 
Korea, Rep 28,830 5.4 2 5.00 4.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 
Kyrgyz Rep 2,070 2.1 1 - - - - - 
Lao PDR 2,400 2.2 3 3.42 2.67 3.33 4.00 3.00 
Lithuania 18,010 4.8 1 - - - - - 
Madagascar 950 3.0 2 4.68 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.50 
Malaysia 14,160 4.3 12 4.86 3.33 3.50 3.25 3.42 
Maldives 7,840 2.5 1 - - - - - 
Moldova 3,370 2.9 1 - - - - - 
Mongolia 3,660 2.7 2 4.68 2.50 2.50 3.50 3.50 
Mozambique 900 2.7 1 - - - - - 
Myanmar NA 1.5 3 4.76 2.67 3.67 3.67 3.00 
Nepal 1,210 2.2 12 3.86 2.33 3.17 3.17 2.75 
Nicaragua 2,660 2.5 1 - - - - - 
Nigeria 2,140 2.4 1 - - - - - 
Pakistan 2,780 2.5 18 4.12 2.00 2.67 3.35 1.94 
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Sources: 
GNI per capita in column (1) is taken from the GNI per capita, PPP (current international $) compiled by the World Bank    
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD   CPI score in column (2) is The 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index 
(Transparency International) http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/   Data shown in columns (3) to (8) are taken from our survey. 
Paraguay 5,050 2.2 1 - - - - - 
Peru 9,320 3.4 1 - - - - - 
Philippines 3,960 2.6 24 4.76 2.58 2.88 3.50 2.67 
Poland 19,180 5.5 1 - - - - - 
Romania 14,300 3.6 4 4.82 2.25 3.00 2.75 2.25 
Sierra Leone 820 2.5 1 - - - - - 
Singapore 56,890 9.2 1 - - - - - 
Slovakia 21,870 4.0 1 - - - - - 
Sri Lanka 5,040 3.3 6 4.47 3.33 3.83 3.40 2.67 
Tanzania 1,430 3.0 8 4.55 2.43 3.50 3.38 2.88 
Thailand 8,150 3.4 15 4.47 2.53 2.93 3.00 2.07 
Turkey 15,460 4.2 2 3.91 2.50 2.50 2.00 2.50 
Uganda 1,250 2.4 4 4.68 2.25 3.00 3.00 3.00 
Ukraine 6,590 2.3 1 - - - - - 
Uzbekistan 3,150 1.6 5 4.40 1.60 2.60 2.20 3.00 
Vietnam 3,060 2.9 11 3.90 1.70 2.27 2.82 2.64 
Zambia 1,370 3.2 4 4.89 1.50 3.75 3.50 2.25 
Zimbabwe NA 2.2 2 4.36 2.50 3.00 3.00 2.50 
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Notes: 
(i) GNI per capita is “based on purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP GNI is gross national income (GNI) converted to international 
dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GNI as a U.S. dollar has 
in the United States. GNI is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included 
in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. 
Data are in current international dollars.” 
(ii) The CPI score of a country indicates “the perceived level of public sector corruption there on a scale of 0 - 10, where 0 means 
that a country is perceived as highly corrupt and 10 means that a country is perceived as very clean” 
(http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/in_detail) 
(iii) PUBSCORE is the respondent’s average score for the eleven questions about CAS behaviors involving public actors, that is, the 
questions shown in Table 1 other than Q5 and Q8. 
(iv) LEVEL is the respondent’s perception of the level of corruption in his or her country rated on a scale of 1 to 5, where 5 means 
“very few are involved” and 1 means “almost everyone is involved.” 
(v) AUDIT is the respondent’s perception of the performance of the audit system in his or her country rated on a scale of 1 to 5, 
where 5 means “very satisfactory” and 1 means “very poor.” 
(vi) MEDIA is the respondent’s perception of the credibility of the domestic media in his or her country rated on a scale of 1 to 5, 
where 5 means “very credible” and 1 means “not at all credible.” 
(vii) ATTITUDE is the respondent’s perception of the ordinary citizens’ attitudes to corruption in his or her country rated on a scale 
of 1 to 5, where 5 means “very harsh” and 1 means “very lenient.” 
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Table 3.  Corruptive behavior acceptance, citizens in Kathmandu vs. GRIPS graduates 
Question name Kathmandu, 
(Truex, 2011) 
 
(1) 
GRIPS survey respondents from 
Low-income 
countries 
(2) 
Middle-income 
countries 
(3) 
High-income 
countries 
(4) 
Q1. Grand cash 4.48 
 
4.49 
(0.085) 
4.76 
(0.066) 
4.97 
(0.031) 
Q2. Petty cash 4.15 
 
4.39 
(0.093) 
4.78 
(0.054) 
4.81 
(0.083) 
Q3. Petty gift 4.10 
 
4.30 
(0.098) 
4.79 
(0.047) 
4.75 
(0.090) 
Q4. Politician job 4.38 
 
4.10 
(0.113) 
4.49 
(0.082) 
4.81 
(0.095) 
Q5. Private job 3.94 
 
3.36 
(0.113) 
3.35 
(0.114) 
3.41 
(0.219) 
Q6. Bureaucrat job 4.44 
 
4.26 
(0.086) 
4.68 
(0.065) 
4.88 
(0.087) 
Q7. Public contract 4.28 
 
4.26 
(0.103) 
4.65 
(0.075) 
4.91 
(0.052) 
Q8. Private contract 3.99 
 
4.21 
(0.092) 
4.19 
(0.098) 
4.44 
(0.179) 
Q9. Favoritism contract 3.83 
 
4.23 
(0.093) 
4.59 
(0.073) 
4.88 
(0.087) 
Q10. Deserved giver 3.86 
 
4.11 
(0.088) 
4.30 
(0.082) 
4.31 
(0.165) 
Q11. Illicit giver 4.45 
 
4.54 
(0.075) 
4.84 
(0.046) 
4.81 
(0.095) 
Q12. Illicit receiver 4.48 
 
4.68 
(0.060) 
4.88 
(0.048) 
4.91 
(0.069) 
Q13. Favoritism ticket 4.35 
 
4.00 
(0.101) 
4.37 
(0.082) 
4.66 
(0.106) 
PUBSCORE (average for 
the 11 public behaviors)  
4.25 4.30 
(0.070) 
4.65 
(0.049) 
4.78 
(0.065) 
Number of observations 853 138 138 33 
Note:  Numbers in parentheses are standard errors of the means (but not standard 
deviations of the scores). 
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Table 4.  Correlation of country averages 
 
Panel A: All countries (N = 57) 
 
Panel B: Countries with three or more respondents (N = 27) 
 
Panel C: Countries with five or more respondents (N = 21) 
 
  
 PUBSCORE LEVEL AUDIT MEDIA ATTITUDE 
PUBSCORE 1     
LEVEL 0.390 1    
AUDIT 0.031 0.563 1   
MEDIA 0.224 0.390 0.425 1  
ATTITUDE 0.195 0.523 0.426 0.267 1 
CPI score 0.381 0.680 0.391 0.327 0.302 
 PUBSCORE LEVEL AUDIT MEDIA ATTITUDE 
PUBSCORE 1     
LEVEL 0.375 1    
AUDIT 0.406 0.497 1   
MEDIA 0.181 0.427 0.407 1  
ATTITUDE 0.238 0.641 0.480 0.220 1 
CPI score 0.432 0.709 0.390 0.179 0.571 
 PUBSCORE LEVEL AUDIT MEDIA ATTITUDE 
PUBSCORE 1     
LEVEL 0.590 1    
AUDIT 0.656 0.788 1   
MEDIA 0.432 0.499 0.408 1  
ATTITUDE 0.466 0.666 0.578 0.231 1 
CPI score 0.502 0.784 0.580 0.290 0.667 
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Table 5.  Regressions of PUBSCORE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All 
countries 
Developing 
countries 
Low- 
income 
countries 
Countries 
with two or 
more obs. 
Developing 
countries 
with 2+ obs 
Low- 
income 
countries 
CPI score 0.100*** 0.233*** 0.184 - - - 
 (3.869) (3.497) (1.228)    
Country dummies - - - Yes Yes Yes 
       
Age -0.010 -0.016* -0.015 -0.023** -0.026*** -0.023** 
 (-1.228) (-1.840) (-1.372) (-2.629) (-3.229) (-2.187) 
Female 0.131 0.140 -0.097 0.012 0.046 -0.242 
 (1.342) (1.275) (-0.360) (0.112) (0.393) (-0.850) 
Christian 0.170 0.195 0.096 -0.063 0.002 -0.484 
 (1.482) (1.511) (0.517) (-0.534) (0.015) (-1.206) 
Muslim 0.235 0.279* 0.078 -0.026 0.081 0.021 
 (1.496) (1.820) (0.355) (-0.177) (0.526) (0.060) 
Urban to urban 0.137 0.106 -0.093 0.270* 0.279* 0.009 
 (1.302) (0.854) (-0.605) (1.846) (1.712) (0.035) 
Rural to urban 0.284** 0.290* 0.146 0.320** 0.377** 0.171 
 (2.453) (2.015) (0.734) (2.086) (2.145) (0.636) 
Private sector -0.019 -0.024 0.169 0.006 -0.005 0.204 
 (-0.152) (-0.160) (0.809) (0.032) (-0.024) (0.829) 
ln(annual income) 0.099*** 0.112*** 0.145*** 0.078** 0.080** 0.111* 
 (3.159) (3.413) (2.857) (2.080) (2.155) (2.009) 
Risk taker 0.071 0.072 0.107 0.038 0.051 0.097 
 (1.451) (1.446) (1.198) (0.630) (0.864) (0.970) 
Patience -0.037 -0.024 -0.015 0.011 0.030 0.024 
 (-0.795) (-0.451) (-0.184) (0.181) (0.470) (0.245) 
Preference for  0.032 -0.000 0.058 0.009 0.005 0.037 
relative evaluation (0.459) (-0.000) (0.489) (0.094) (0.053) (0.239) 
Procrastination -0.074 -0.106* -0.090 -0.076 -0.114* -0.085 
 (-1.499) (-1.913) (-1.207) (-1.412) (-1.974) (-0.985) 
Constant 3.282*** 3.047*** 2.731** 4.347*** 4.242*** 3.673*** 
 (4.914) (4.609) (2.712) (6.889) (6.795) (3.346) 
Observations 275 245 123 256 232 117 
R-squared 0.158 0.177 0.165 0.328 0.327 0.281 
Numbers in parentheses are robust t-statistics, clustered at the country level to account for 
correlation among respondents in the same country.  *, **, and *** indicate the 10, 5, and 1 
percent levels of significance, respectively.  The sample consists of the countries with two or 
more observations in columns (4) to (5), those with three or more observations in columns (6) to 
(12).  
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Table 5 (continued).  
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Countries 
with 5 or 
more obs. 
Developing 
countries 
Low- 
income 
countries 
Countries 
with 5 or 
more obs. 
Developing 
countries 
Low- 
income 
countries 
CPI score 0.104*** 0.257*** 0.190 - - - 
 (3.358) (3.514) (1.135)    
Country dummies - - - Yes Yes Yes 
       
Age -0.012 -0.017* -0.020 -0.025*** -0.028*** -0.027** 
 (-1.318) (-1.875) (-1.709) (-2.883) (-3.438) (-2.633) 
Female 0.170 0.188 -0.041 0.046 0.073 -0.217 
 (1.574) (1.608) (-0.146) (0.435) (0.640) (-0.757) 
Christian 0.167 0.202 0.051 -0.059 -0.023 -0.505 
 (1.263) (1.392) (0.262) (-0.462) (-0.155) (-1.230) 
Muslim 0.267 0.271 0.066 0.047 0.082 0.036 
 (1.576) (1.638) (0.289) (0.338) (0.512) (0.100) 
Urban to urban 0.139 0.120 -0.110 0.275* 0.298* 0.015 
 (1.161) (0.889) (-0.626) (1.863) (1.767) (0.053) 
Rural to urban 0.295** 0.299* 0.149 0.322* 0.369* 0.146 
 (2.273) (1.867) (0.656) (2.046) (2.011) (0.503) 
Private sector -0.020 -0.041 0.209 0.052 0.034 0.273 
 (-0.142) (-0.243) (0.972) (0.282) (0.163) (1.145) 
ln(annual income) 0.112*** 0.120*** 0.172*** 0.084** 0.085** 0.126** 
 (3.445) (3.617) (4.147) (2.302) (2.321) (2.357) 
Risk taker 0.060 0.072 0.088 0.033 0.048 0.091 
 (1.108) (1.317) (0.958) (0.549) (0.792) (0.937) 
Patience -0.028 0.002 0.014 0.020 0.031 0.038 
 (-0.507) (0.029) (0.158) (0.328) (0.470) (0.374) 
Preference for  0.035 0.006 0.088 0.016 0.007 0.037 
relative evaluation (0.436) (0.069) (0.726) (0.154) (0.063) (0.237) 
Procrastination -0.090* -0.110* -0.104 -0.086 -0.116* -0.095 
 (-1.711) (-1.863) (-1.353) (-1.620) (-2.003) (-1.148) 
Constant 3.225*** 2.822*** 2.600** 4.464*** 4.655*** 4.580*** 
 (4.303) (3.749) (2.485) (7.203) (7.137) (4.398) 
Observations 239 219 112 239 219 112 
R-squared 0.168 0.186 0.177 0.330 0.329 0.287 
 
